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State v. Giles and Wear, No. 78339-5; State v. Boyd, No.79371-9

                                         No. 79371-9
                                     (consolidated with 
                                        No. 79339-5)

       J.M. JOHNSON (dissenting) -- The plain language of criminal rule (CrR)

4.7(a) does not require that the State provide the defense with copies of the 

evidence it intends to use at trial.  Rather, CrR 4.7(a) requires disclosure, which is 

satisfied if the State provides the defense with notice of its intended evidence and 

access thereto sufficient for the defense to prepare.  In its discretion, a trial court 

may order the State to provide the defense with copies of its evidence in a particular 

case.  However, when dealing with child pornography, such an order should be 

issued only after a particularized showing of need sufficient to overcome the 

important interests weighing against duplicating and disseminating such 

pornographic contraband.  Because no such showing of need was made by the 

defense for respondent Giles or respondent Wear, I dissent from the majority's 

decision to affirm orders issued by the trial court requiring copies of all 

pornographic evidence in those cases.  For similar reasons, I also dissent from the 

majority's decision to reverse the trial court's discretionary determination not to  

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

order the State to provide copies of the child pornography evidence in the case of 

petitioner Boyd.

A.     CrR 4.7(a) Requires Notice and Access, Not Copies

       The majority correctly concludes that the main provision governing access to 

intended evidence in these cases is CrR 4.7(a).1  Majority at 7. However, the 

majority misinterprets the plain language of this rule. CrR 4.7(a) provides, in 

relevant part:

       Except as otherwise provided by protective orders or as to matters not 
       subject to disclosure, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the 
       defendant the following material and information . . . any books, 
       papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects, which the 
       prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial . . . .

CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) (emphasis added). In short, prosecutors have an obligation to 

"disclose" to the defendant any materials or objects which they intend to use at trial.  

CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v). However, to "disclose" does not mean to "provide copies." The 

rule could easily be rewritten to require the latter, but such amendment to our court 

rules should be properly proposed and carefully considered by this court.

       The term "disclose" is not defined in CrR 4.7 or elsewhere in the rules, so 

reference to its dictionary definition is appropriate.  The dictionary provides that to 

1 Subsection (h)(4) of CrR 4.7, which provides for protective orders, is also relevant, as is further 
discussed below.

                                               2 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

"disclose" means "to expose to view . . . to make known."  Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 645 (2002).  Thus, the rule's plain language requires the 

State, at least, to inform defense counsel of the existence of materials it intends to 

use at trial.  See State v. Penn, 23 Wn. App. 202, 204, 596 P.2d 1341 (concluding

State complied with disclosure obligation under CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) by providing 

defendant with statement listing "narcotics paraphernalia in general" as a tangible 
object intended for use at trial), review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1026 (1979);2 State v. 

Smith, 15 Wn. App. 716, 721, 552 P.2d 1059 (1976) ("CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) requires the 

prosecution to reveal the existence and nature of tangible evidence intended for use 

at trial.") (emphasis added). Making the evidence known or exposing it to view 

may also, logically, entail making the materials available for inspection.  However, 

providing the defense with its own copies of all such materials, to peruse or use at 

its convenience, is not required to comply with the mandate "to expose [the 

evidence] to view" or "to make [it] known" to the defense.  Webster's Third New 

2 The majority attempts to limit the usefulness of Penn by stating that "[i]t did not address the 
sufficiency of the access [the defendant] would have received" to the contraband evidence at 
issue.  Majority at 8 n.3.  This assertion, however, does not alter the fact that the Penn court 
addressed the State's duty to "disclose to the defendant . . . any tangible objects" under CrR 
4.7(a)(1)(v) and concluded that including the description "'narcotics paraphernalia in general'" in 
its discovery documents was sufficient to satisfy the state's burden. 23 Wn. App. at 204.  Thus, 
the case supports the conclusion that even mere acknowledgement of the existence of evidence 
may satisfy the state's burden of disclosure under CrR 4.7(a) in some cases.     

                                               3 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

International Dictionary 645 (2002).  Accordingly, the plain language of CrR 4.7(a) 

does not require that the State always provide the defense with copies of all 

intended evidence.  The majority errs in holding to the contrary.  See majority at 8.

       Because the plain language of CrR 4.7(a) does not support the majority's 

position that copies are mandatory, it relies instead on "the policies underlying the 

rules." Majority at 8-11.  However, where the plain language of a court rule is 

unambiguous, the rule is to be enforced in accordance with that language. Gourley 

v. Gourley, 158 Wn.2d 460, 466, 145 P.3d 1185 (2006).  As explained above, the 

plain language of CrR 4.7(a) does not require copies.  Because there is no ambiguity 

on this point, it is inappropriate to engage in amendment by construction based on 

underlying policies.  Gourley, 158 Wn.2d at 466.

       Even assuming such construction was found to be appropriate, the majority's

analysis is flawed.  The majority primarily focuses its argument on two principles: 

(1) fairness and (2) the right to adequate representation.  See majority at 8.  

Specifically regarding fairness, the majority states that "[t]he discovery rules 'are 

designed to enhance the search for truth' and their application by the trial court 

should 'insure a fair trial to all concerned, neither according to one party an unfair 

advantage nor placing the other at a disadvantage.'" Majority at 8 (quoting State v. 

                                               4 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

Boehme, 71 Wn.2d 621, 632-33, 430 P.2d 527 (1967)).3 The majority also cites to 

this court's statement in State v. Yates, 111 Wn.2d 793, 797, 765 P.2d 291 (1988) 

(quoting Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal 

Procedure 77 (West Pub'g Co. ed. 1971)) that:

              "In order to provide adequate information for informed pleas, 
       expedite trials, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective 
       cross-examination, and meet the requirements of due process, 
       discovery prior to trial should be as full and free as possible consistent 
       with protections of persons, effective law enforcement, the adversary 
       system and national security."

Majority at 9.

       I agree with the majority that CrR 4.7(a) should be interpreted in a manner 

which "insure[s] a fair trial to all concerned" and provides for discovery that is "as 

full and free as possible consistent with" other competing policy concerns. Majority 

at 8, 9. However, I do not agree that this concern for fairness requires that the plain 

language of CrR 4.7(a) be distorted to create a mandate that the State provide the 

defense with copies of all materials the State intends to use at trial in every case.  

Rather, I conclude that acknowledging the existence of the evidence and making it 

reasonably available for inspection, as is required by the plain disclosure language 

3 The majority's use of this quote appears to overlook the emphasis placed on victims' rights by 
Washington law. See, e.g., Const. art. I, § 35.  Ensuring "a fair trial to all concerned" requires 
consideration of the victims' interests as well as those of the parties.

                                               5 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

of CrR 4.7(a), satisfies the fairness concerns cited by the majority.  In these cases, 

my conclusion is supported by concerns for the constitutional rights of the victims as 

well as the illegal nature of the child pornography evidence.

       Regarding the right to adequate representation, the majority notes that the 

"right to effective assistance includes a 'reasonable investigation' by defense 

counsel" and "also guarantees expert assistance if necessary to an adequate 

defense." Majority at 10.  The majority argues that CrR 4.7(a) must be construed in 

a manner which "harmoniz[es] with the right to effective assistance." Majority at 

11.  Thus, the majority concludes that "[w]here the nature of the case is such that 

copies are necessary in order that defense counsel can fulfill [its] critical role, CrR 

4.7(a) obliges the prosecutor to provide copies of the evidence . . . ." Majority at 

11.

       I agree that CrR 4.7(a) must be applied in a manner that comports with 

defendants' constitutional rights, including the right to effective assistance of

counsel.  However, as the majority appears to concede, copies are not necessary in 

every case for defense counsel to effectively prepare.  While there may be some 

instances "[w]here the nature of the case" may make such copies necessary, 

majority at 11, this possibility does not justify construing CrR 4.7(a) to impose a 

                                               6 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

mandatory requirement upon the State to provide copies in all cases.  Instead, 

whether the State must provide copies is a matter that should be left to the discretion 

of the trial court in each case.4

       Moreover, I reject the majority's suggestion that copies should be deemed 

necessary in all cases involving child pornography evidence.  Majority at 12-13.  

That the constitutional rights of criminal defendants do not require that copies be 

provided in every case involving child pornography has been expressly confirmed 

by many federal courts, which have substantial experience with the subject due to 

the unfortunate frequency of interstate and international trafficking in child 
pornography.5  Federal courts have held that, on its face, section 504 of the Adam 

Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act), Pub. L. No. 109-

248, 120 Stat. 587 (July 27, 2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)), which 

requires courts to deny "any request by the defendant to copy . . . any property or 

4 Although the plain language of CrR 4.7(a) does not obligate the State to provide copies of 
evidence to the defense, trial courts have discretion to order such copies in appropriate 
circumstances.  In deciding whether and how to exercise this discretion, trial courts must take into 
account defendants' constitutional rights.  Thus, "[w]here the nature of the case is such that 
copies are necessary," majority at 11, a trial court can require the State to provide copies, subject 
to protective order.

5 That the federal courts have reached this conclusion is made even more significant by the fact 
that they, unlike this court, are not constitutionally required to consider the rights of crime 
victims.  Const. art. I, § 35.  

                                               7 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

material that constitutes child pornography . . . so long as the Government makes 

the property or material reasonably available to the defendant," offends neither the 

Fifth or Sixth Amendment.6  United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642-

43 (E.D. Va. 2007); United States v. O'Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (D. 

Ariz. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019-20 (N.D. Iowa 

2006).  Moreover, even prior to the enactment of the above federal statute, two 

federal circuit courts concluded that it was not error for a trial court to deny a 

defendant's motion for copies of child pornography evidence.  See United States v. 

Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 792 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 

730-31 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Husband, 246 F. Supp. 2d 467, 

469 (E.D. Va. 2003) (refusing to order that "contraband [such as child pornography] 

be distributed to defendant or his counsel" and concluding that the government "met 

its obligation under Rule 16 . . . by allowing access to the tape" at issue).

       In sum, I reject the majority's conclusion rewriting CrR 4.7(a) to obligate the 

6 In enacting the "Child Pornography Prevention" portion of the Adam Walsh Act, Congress 
found, among other things, that the "distribution . . . and possession of child pornography . . . is 
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children depicted [therein] and 
has a substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole." Adam Walsh Act § 501(1)(A).  
Congress also found that persons who initially seek and distribute child pornography purely on an 
intrastate basis are "likely to enter the interstate market in child pornography in search of 
additional child pornography, thereby stimulating demand in the interstate market in child 
pornography," id. at § 501(1)(D)(i), and are likely to contribute their own materials to this 
market.  Id. at § 501(1)(D)(ii).

                                               8 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

State to provide the defense with copies of "any books, papers, documents, 

photographs, or tangible objects, which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in 

the hearing or trial . . . ." CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v). Instead, I would hold, in accordance 

with the plain language of the rule, that the State satisfies its burden to "disclose"

under CrR 4.7(a) by alerting the defense to the existence of the materials or objects, 

which the State intends to use, and making this evidence reasonably available.

B.     Although CrR 4.7(a) Does Not Require Copies, a Trial Court May Order 
       Copies in its Discretion, Subject to Appropriate Protective Conditions

       Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, decisions regarding the scope of 

discovery lie within the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Norby, 122 

Wn.2d 258, 268, 858 P.2d 210 (1993) (citing State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wn.2d 457, 470-

71, 800 P.2d 338 (1990)).  Thus, although CrR 4.7(a) does not require the State to 

provide the defense with copies of the materials it intends to use at trial, see Part A,

supra, the trial court has discretion to order such copies in appropriate 

circumstances.  Any such order should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

       A proper exercise of trial court discretion in these circumstances requires a 

showing of need for copies requested by the defense. It would be manifestly 

unreasonable for a trial court to order the State to go beyond providing notice and

access absent any proof that such disclosure is inadequate to meet the defense's 

                                               9 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

needs.7 Particularly where the evidence at issue is child pornography, I would hold 

that a trial court's order to provide copies must be supported by a particularized

showing of need sufficient to overcome the numerous, important interests that weigh 

against copying and disseminating such contraband. These interests include crime 

prevention, protection of victims in general and child victims of sex offenses in 

particular, and protection of individual privacy interests.  Consideration of these 

countervailing interests is both reasonable and necessary to ensure that trial courts 

do not run afoul of the spirit, if not the letter, of Washington law by ordering the 

State to provide copies of child pornography evidence.  See, e.g., RCW 9.68A.050

(felony to duplicate and/or disseminate child pornography).  Ultimately, I conclude 

that these considerations dictate against ordering copies in most cases.  

       First, to order the State to duplicate and disseminate child pornography 

evidence runs counter to this State's criminal law.  For obvious example, RCW 

9.68A.050 criminalizes "Dealing in depictions of minor engaged in sexually explicit 

conduct." This statute reads as follows:

7 The majority states that to require a showing of need by the defendant to support an order for 
copies "is to ignore the inherent materiality of the disclosure mandated by CrR 4.7(a)." Majority 
at 14. However, it is not my position that a defendant must make a showing of need to obtain 
disclosure of the evidence the State intends to use at trial.  The State must automatically comply 
with its obligation to disclose its evidence under CrR 4.7(a).  However, the State should not be 
required to go beyond its mandatory burden of providing notice and access unless and until there 
is a showing of need by the defense. 

                                               10 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

       A person who:
              (1) Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, 
       disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells any 
       visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of 
       sexually explicit conduct; or
              (2) Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, 
       disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that depicts 
       a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct
       is guilty of a class C felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW.

RCW 9.68A.050.  Similarly, RCW 9.68A.070 criminalizes the knowing possession 

of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  See also RCW 

9.68A.120(1) ("All visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in sexually 

explicit conduct" is subject to seizure and forfeiture.).  In light of the above statutes, 

it is clear that a court order requiring the State to copy and distribute child 

pornography evidence conflicts with our State's criminal law.  

       Ordering the State to provide copies of child pornography evidence also 

implicates the interests protected by article I, section 35 of our state constitution.  

This provision expresses our people's intent that crime victims be treated with "due 

dignity and respect."  Const. art. I, § 35.  To order duplication and dissemination of 

child pornography evidence in a child sex offense trial affords the child victim 

neither dignity nor respect.  Instead, it further harms the child by increasing the 

                                               11 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

audience for the child's victimization as well as magnifying the risk that the 

materials will be made available to the public at large.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 

U.S. 747, 759, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982) (each duplication of a 

piece of child pornography results in yet another "permanent record of the 

children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 

circulation").  Thus, a court order to provide copies contradicts the policy embodied 

in our state constitution.     

       In addition to protecting victims in general, Washington law expressly 

provides for the protection of child victims of sex offenses in particular.  Our 

legislature has concluded that the "prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of 

children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance" and that the 

"care of children is a sacred trust." RCW 9.68A.001.  Our legislature has also 

expressed an intent "to insure that all child victims and witnesses of crime are 

treated with . . . sensitivity, courtesy, and special care."  RCW 7.69A.010.  It is 

difficult to comprehend how a court order compelling the State to duplicate and 

disseminate child pornography evidence can be reconciled with the preservation of 

the State's "sacred trust" regarding child sex offense victims.  RCW 9.68A.001.  

Hence, such an order contradicts another aspect of our State's public policy.

                                               12 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

       Finally, to compel the State to provide copies of child pornography evidence 

also implicates the strong right of privacy enshrined in our state constitution.  See

Const. art. I, § 7.  There can be no question that duplication and dissemination of 

pornographic images of a child victim constitutes an extreme invasion of that child's 

private affairs.  See Adam Walsh Act § 501(2)(D) ("Every instance of viewing 

images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the 

victims and a repetition of their abuse."). Thus, a court order to automatically 

provide copies of child sex pictures runs counter to this separate provision of our 

state constitution.

       Ultimately, in light of the above interests, I believe that mandating notice to 

defense counsel and adequate access for inspection is the appropriate approach to 

take in most cases involving child pornography evidence.  My conclusion is 

supported by the fact that this approach has already been adopted at the federal 

level and by some of our sister states.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m); Ariz. R. Crim. P.

15.1(j); Cal. Penal Code § 1054.10. As summarized by Congress: "It is imperative 

to prohibit the reproduction of child pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid 

repeated violation and abuse of victims, so long as the government makes 

reasonable accommodations for the inspection, viewing, and examination of such 

                                               13 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

material for the purposes of mounting a criminal defense." Adam Walsh Act 

§ 501(2)(F).

       Additionally, in those limited circumstances where a trial court determines

that an order to provide copies is appropriate, I would hold that the trial court must 

subject defense receiving copies to stringent protective conditions.  Such conditions 

should be imposed by issuing a protective order pursuant to CrR 4.7(h)(4).8 While 

protective orders are to be issued under this rule upon a showing of cause by the 

State, see note 8, supra, such a showing can easily be made in all cases involving 

child pornography evidence, given the many interests weighing against duplication 

and dissemination, discussed above.  The majority provides a helpful outline of 

some of the particular conditions that should be imposed.  Majority at 16-17.

C.     The Record in State v. Giles and Wear Did Not Establish Need for Copies to 
       Prepare the Defense

       The trial court in the cases of Giles and Wear required the State to provide 

copies of all child pornography evidence to the defense.  Majority at 2.  However, 

the record reveals that neither Giles nor Wear made a particularized showing of 

8 CrR 4.7(h)(4) provides:
       Upon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order that specified disclosure 
       be restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that 
       all material and information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to 
       permit the party's counsel to make beneficial use thereof.  

                                               14 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

need for these copies sufficient to overcome the numerous interests weighing against 

copies.  Counsel for both respondents offered the trial court only generalized

allegations of unfairness, unconstitutionality, and inconvenience to support their 

demands for copies.  See Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings (VTP) (Sept. 20, 

2006) at 5-11, 19-21, State v. Giles and Wear, Nos. 06-1-03604-4 and 06-1-03616-

8 (Pierce County Super. Ct., Wash.). Neither defense counsel presented any 

documentation or testimony as to his or her need for copies of particular materials to 

prepare the cases. Cf. United States v. Frabizio, 341 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 

2004) (defendant's successful motion to compel copies of child pornography 

evidence supported by affidavit from retained expert detailing proposed analysis of 

particular items of evidence and costs associated with being required to conduct 

analysis at government facility). Moreover, neither counsel even argued there was a

need for copies to facilitate any expert preparation or testimony.  Giles' counsel 

admitted that he had never attempted to view any of the State's evidence prior to 

bringing the motion to compel.  VTP (Sept. 20, 2006) at 10-11.

       The State reasonably responded with an offer to provide private access to the 

child pornography for defense counsel, their clients, and their experts.  VTP

(Sept. 20, 2006) at 14, 17-18, 22. The State argued that such access, rather than 

                                               15 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

copies, was the appropriate approach in light of the risk of harm to the child victims.  

VTP (Sept. 20, 2006) at 12. The State also pointed out that the evidence sought by 

Giles and Wear consisted primarily of 21 videotapes made by the defendants

themselves. VTP (Sept. 20, 2006) at 13-14.  Based on this record, I would hold that 

the trial court abused its discretion in both Giles and Wear by ordering the State to 

provide the defense with copies of the child pornography evidence.  There is no 

evidence of actual need in the record to support the trial court's orders.  Thus, I 

dissent from the majority's decision to affirm these orders.  See majority at 21.

D.     The Record in State v. Boyd Does Not Support Finding an Abuse of 
       Discretion

       In the case of Boyd, the trial court denied defense counsel's motion to compel 

copying of the pornography in question.  Majority at 2.  I would affirm the trial 

court.  Boyd's counsel did make a particularized claim of need for copies to prepare 

Boyd's defense but provided no factual support for her claim.  In particular, counsel 

argued that her expert(s) needed a mirror image of Boyd's computer's hard drive, as 

well as copies of all the photographs to be used by the state, to effectively assist in 

preparing Boyd's defense.  See Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Oct. 10, 

2006) at 9-12, 32, State v. Boyd, No. 04-1-05178-1 (Pierce County Super. Ct., 

Wash.). However, counsel submitted no documentation or testimony supporting the

                                               16 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

need to have her own copies, as opposed to having reasonable access to the 

evidence within a state facility. The State responded with an offer to provide 

reasonable, private access to the evidence for defense counsel, her client, and her 

expert. VRP (Oct. 10, 2006) at 25-26, 28. The State argued that this was the better

approach in light of the compelling need to protect the victims in this case. VRP 

(Oct. 10, 2006) at 30-31.

       Ultimately, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determined that the 

defense's showing of need was insufficient to justify an order to provide copies.  

VRP (Oct. 10, 2006) at 36-37.  Instead, the court ordered the State to provide the 

defense with access to the evidence sufficient to accommodate the defense's trial 

preparation needs. VRP (Oct. 10, 2006) at 37-41; see also Mot. for Discretionary 

Review, App. A (Protective Order Regarding Def.'s Access to Child Pornography, 

State v. Boyd, No. 04-1-05178-1 (Pierce County Super. Ct., Wash. Oct. 17, 2003)).  

In light of the record, the trial court's decision cannot be deemed manifestly 

unreasonable.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the majority's 

reversal contradicts our long-standing rule of deferring to trial courts on such 

matters.

                                         Conclusion

                                               17 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

       The majority has erroneously construed the plain language of the "disclosure"

rule, CrR 4.7(a), to require the State to provide the defense with copies of the 

pornography evidence it intends to use at trial.  Copies of child pornography should 

be provided only when a trial court determines, in its discretion, that the defense's 

particularized showing of need outweighs the substantial policy interests weighing 

against duplication and dissemination of such pornography contraband. These 

interests of victims, and child sex crime victims especially, are clearly expressed in 

our State's constitution and legislation but have been grievously disregarded by the 

majority. Accordingly, I dissent. 

AUTHOR:
       Justice James M. Johnson

WE CONCUR:

                                               18 

State v. Giles and Wear, No. 79339-5; State v. Boyd, No. 79371-9

                                               19